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KENNETH A. SWIECICKI, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, and UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRA-
TION, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 18315 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Review in accordance with Utah 
Code Annotated 35-4-lO(i) seeking a reversal of the Board of Review's deci-
sion denying him unemployment benefits. 
Plaintiff was denied benefits, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4-S(d), from 
August 2 through August 8, 1981 by virtue of his unemployment arising from 
a strike i nvol vi ng his grade, cl ass or group of workers at the establish-
ment where he was last employed. Plaintiff was also denied benefits on the 
ground that he left work voluntarily without good cause, U.C.A. 35-4-S(a). 
The effective date under this last provision was August 2, 1981, with the 
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disqualification period to extend until such time as Plaintiff has earned 
wages at least six times his weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered em-
ployment. 
The issue on appeal is whether there is competent and reasonable evi-
dence in the record to support the Board of Review's decision denying 
Plaintiff unemployment benefits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an affinnance of the Board of Review's decision denying 
Plaintiff unemployment benefits and further prays that the Court will deny 
Plaintiff any costs or attorney's fees incurred in this action. 
FACTUAL SITUATION 
Plaintiff was hired by the Federal Aviation Administration in Febru-
ary, 1974, (R.0040) and was employed as an air traffic controller at the Salt 
Lake City Tower during the time period in question herein (R.0040). 
On August 3, 1981, Plaintiff failed to report for work (R.0041) with 
full knowledge that an air traffic controller strike ·had begun on the same 
day (R.0049). Plaintiff was a member of the Professional Air Traffic Con-
trollers Organization (PATCO) (R.0040 & .0059), which was the union calling 
the strike ( R .0059), and Pl ai nti ff subsequently did not report to work on 
August 4 and 5 as the strike proceeded (R.0041). 
On August 6, 1981, Plaintiff telephoned Mr. Warren Lee, Deputy Chief, 
Salt Lake City Tower, at about 7:00 a.m. regarding the procedure for report-
ing to work (R.0047) within President Reagan's amnesty period (R.0042-0043). 
- 2 -
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Plaintiff apparently had some knowledge of the amnesty period (R.0041) des-
pite his confusion with media reports {R.0062). Plaintiff infonned Mr. Lee 
that he was prepared to come to work (R.0047) and Mr. Lee responded that 
Plaintiff should report to work by 8 a.m. (R.0047). If Plaintiff had re-
ported at 8 a.m. on August 6, then he would have complied with the amnesty 
program and been all owed to work ( R .0042). Plaintiff indicated he would 
report by 8 a.m. or shortly thereafter (R.0047), but apparently failed to do 
so and called Mr. Lee some time after 8 a.m. {R.0047). At this time, Mr. Lee 
extended Plaintiff's time for reporting to work until 9 a.m. (R.0047). 
At approximately 9:00 or 9:15 a.m., Plaintiff contacted Mr. Lee and 
told him he would report for duty, and Mr. Lee replied, 11 Fine. 11 (R.0047). 
Mr. Lee then proceeded to give Plaintiff instructions on how to gain access 
to the tower (R.0047). Plaintiff was to enter the airport on the east side 
and park in the Utah National Guard area lR.0049). This entrance was on 
the opposite side of the airport from the tower (R.0049) and Plaintiff was 
to be ·transported from there to the tower by ·van (R.0049).. This procedure 
was part of the F .A.A.' s contingency pl an that had been in effect si nee the 
strike began (R.0049). It is disputed whether Plaintiff would have to cross 
any picket lines when entering the Utah National Guard parking -area (R.0049), 
but no evi de nee was offered to show that violence had erupted when i ndivi d-
uals attempted to cross the picket lines. 
In response to Mr. Lee's instructions, Plaintiff stated that, "I cannot 
do something like that at this time. 11 (R.0048). Plaintiff, subsequently, 
did not attempt to report to work (R.0048), but he did report later in the 
- 3 -
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evening around 11:30 p.m. (R.0041 & 0049) after being approached by the 
F.B.I. (R.0041 & 0048). No pickets were present when Plaintiff reported in 
the evening (R.0049). Upon presenting himself to the supervisor, Plaintiff 
was told that an intent to tenninate was in progress and he should leave the 
facility immediately (R.0041). 
Plaintiff contacted the Salt Lake Tower on the morning of August 7 and 
infonned the personnel he was seeking professional help (R.0043). This was 
the first time Plaintiff had made any mention of illness to the personnel at 
the tower {R.0042). Later that day Plaintiff was treated by Dr. David A. 
Schein, M.D., Ph.D., (R.0042 & 0064) for anxiety, insomnia and other dis-
orders {R.0041 & 0064). These disorders, however, had apparently developed 
during the las.t few days of July {R.0042), although Dr. Schien stated in 
his letter the air traffic controller strike led to these disorders (R.0064). 
Dr. Schein prescribed valium for treatment of Plaintiff's disorders {R.0042). 
On August 9, 1981, a letter was sent to Plaintiff infonning him of an 
intent to remove him from his position as air traffic controller {R.0064 & 
0065). Plaintiff responded in a letter dated August 19, 1981, setting forth 
his reasons for not reporting to work (R.0062). In his letter, Plaintiff 
attached Dr. Schei n's letter containing a diagnosis of Plaintiff's condition 
( R .0067). As a result of Plaintiff's response, Dr. H. C. Burton, Assistant 
Regional Fl.ight Surgeon for the Salt Lake Air Traffic Control Center, was 
asked to investigate Plaintiff's illness and detennine suitability for work 
(R.0044). Dr. Burton reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and concluded 
there was no documented findings which rendered Plaintiff medically disabled 
and unfit for duty { R.0058). Consequently, Pl ai nti ff was i nfonned by a 
- 4 -
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letter dated September 8, 1981, that he was officially tenninated effective 
September 15, 1981 (R.0056). 
Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits on August 27, 1981 (R.0061). 
Plaintiff was denied benefits in a decision rendered by Tom L. Brant pursuant 
. to the U.C.A. 35-4-5( d) (R.0055). Pl ai nti ff al so received an El gibil ity 
Detennination, Form 615-A, stating denial of benefits pursuant to U.C.A. 
35-4-S{b) (1) (R.0054\. Plaintiff appealed the denial of benefits to the 
Appeals Referee on October 13, 1981 {R.0052). The Referee denied benefits 
pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4-5(d) and 5(a) (R.0035-0037), and the Board of Review 
affi nned the Referee 1 s decision ( R .0016). Thereafter, Plaintiff fi 1 ed this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN REVIEWING A DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTAN-
TIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Defendant submits that this Court's review of detenninations of the 
Department is limited to dee i ding whether there is substantial competent 
evidence to sustain such detenninations. Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 
Utah 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). A reversal of an order of the Department 
denying compensation can only be justified if there is no substantial evi-
dence to sustain the detennination and the facts giving rise to a right to 
- 5 -
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compensation are so persuasive that the Department's denial was clearly 
capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Dept. 
of Emp. Sec., 13 Utah 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 
Utah 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44,45 (1966); Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review, 
568 P. 2d 727 {Utah 1977); In Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. In-
dustrial Commission, 104 Utah 242, 139 P. 2d 208, 211, the Court said: 
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain 
the findings and decisions of the Industrial Commission, 
this court may not set aside the decision even though on 
a review of the record we might well have reached a dif-
ferent result. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S UNEMPLOYMENT, DURING THE PERIOD OF AUGUST 3 
THROUGH AUGUST 6, WAS DUE TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED 
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING HIS GRADE, CLASS OR GROUP OF 
WORKERS, AND PLAINTIFF IS THEREFORE INELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS 
FOR THAT PERIOD. 
The Defendant wishes to bring to the Court's attention that Plaintiff 
did not address in his Brief the denial of benefits pursuant to U.C.A. 
35-4-5{d). Plaintiff merely states in his Brief {at page 10) that he 
should be disqualified for voluntarily leaving work for the duration only 
of the period August 3 through August 6, 1981. However, such a conclusion 
ignores the fact that a strike was in progress during that period, and that 
Plaintiff failed to cross the picket lines. (R.0040, 0041}. Under such 
circumstances, this court has previously held that benefits must be denied 
pursuant to Section 5(d) of the Employment Security Act. Kennecott Copper 
Corp. Employees v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., Supra. 
- 6 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF 
VOLUNTARILY LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, AND SUCH DECISION 
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The issues presented by this case are: 1) whether the Pl ai nti ff• s 
fai 1 ure to report for work as requi rd by his employer constitutes a vol u n-
tary quit; and 2) whether the Plaintiff had good cause for not reporting 
to work as required by the employer. 
Voluntary quitting is a mixed question of law and fact. Denby v. 
Board of Revfew of the Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 626 {Utah, 1977). 
This court has repeatedly held that the di squal i fi ca ti on provisions of the 
Employment Security Act reveal an underlying legislative intent for the 
commission to detenni ne a claimant's eligibility by adhering to the vol i-
ti onal test; 01 of Ne 1 son Construction Co. v. I ndustri a 1 Commission, 121 Utah 
525, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952); Lexes v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 551, 243 
P. 2d 964 (1952); or in other words, a claimant will be ineligible for bene-
fits if his unemployment is· the result of voluntary action by him and was 
not caused by some· coercive factor or economic influence beyond his control. 
Mills v. Gronning, 581 P. 2d 1334, 1337 {Utah, .1978). This principle is 
common 1 y k now n as the 11 fau1 t concept. 11 
Plaintiff argues that he was discharged and that his discharge must be 
evaluated under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
(Pocket Supplement). See Plaintiff's Brief, page 10. While it is undisputed 
that the claimant was discharged, both the Appeal Referee and the Board of 
Review concluded that the facts of the case were more consistent with a 
voluntary leaving than a discharge for misconduct. 
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There is a split among the many jurisdictions which have dealt with 
the question of voluntary leaving v. discharge for misconduct, under cir-
cumstances where an employee is tenninated for failure to report to work. 
See Annotation, "Discharge for Absenteeism as Affecting Right to Unempl oy-
ment Compensation," 41 ALR 2d 1158 (1955). See also Annotation, "Discharge 
for Absenteeism or Tardiness as Affecting Right to Unemployment Compensa-
tion, 11 58 ALR 3rd 674 ( 1974). The decisions referred to in these annota-
tions all appear to rely on the specific law of the jurisdiction involved 
and the facts of the particular case. However, in general, it appears the 
courts which held that the claimant was discharged for misconduct found 
the claimant's conduct to meet that level of "willful, wanton or deliber-
ate" conduct normally associated with the definition of misconduct, as set 
forth in Boynton Cab Company v. Nuebeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N. W. 636; and 
as adopted by this court in Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah, Supra. On the other hand, those courts 
·which applied the voluntary leaving disqualification generally found each 
claimant's actions to be the result of voluntary choice not affected by 
factors beyond the claimant's control, but not rising to the level of culp-
ability necessary to find misconduct. Although a discharge for misconduct 
also generally results from the voluntary action of the employee, the differ-
ence in cases of this nature lies in the evidence of an intent to hann the 
employer or to deliberately disregard the employer's rightful interests. 
Lacking sue h intent, a claimant's actions may· not be misconduct. However, 
where the claimant's actions are voluntary and not influenced by "coercive 
factors or economic influence beyond his control, 11 the claimant• s resulting 
unemployment is volitional, thus subjecting him to di squal i ficati on under 
the Act. 
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In the instant case the Appeal Referee concluded that the evidence 
of record indicated that the claimant's failure to return to work within 
the "grace period" was voluntary and that his resulting unemployment was, 
therefore, volitional. 
The undisputed facts in this matter are that Plaintiff was employed by 
the Federal Aviation Admi ni strati on as an air traffic controller at the 
Salt Lake Air Traffic Control Center; that a nationwide air traffic control-
lers' strike commenced on or about August 3, 1981; that Plaintiff failed to 
report for work on August 3, 4 and 5, 1981; that President Reagan granted 
an "amnesty period" for all air traffic controllers who would report for 
work at the beginning of their first scheduled shift after 11 a.m. Eastern 
Standard Time; that Plaintiff did not report for work as scheduled at 
8 a.m. on August 6, nor did he report after a one hour extension to 9 a.m., 
but rather, Pl ai nti ff reported at 11 :30 p .m. the night of August 6, and 
then only after the F .B.l. advised Pl ai nti ff that a restraining order was 
in effect which "literally scared the hell out of" Plaintiff. (See Plain-
tiff's Brief, pages 3, 4 8, · 9.) Upon Plaintiff's failure to comply with 
the tenns of the President's "Amnesty Period," Plaintiff was tenninated by 
the employer. 
Given the foregoing facts, the Appeal Referee and Board of Review 
properly concluded that the claimant voluntarily left his employment. 
Pl ai nti ff argues that even if the court finds he voluntarily quit, 
he did so with good cause, or at least that his quit was under such circum-
stances that a denial of benefits is contrary to equity and good consi ence. 
(Plaintiff's Brief, pages 11~15.) 
- 9 -
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Plaintiff's argument that he had good cause for leaving work or that 
his leaving. was reasonable under the circumstances is based on the conten-
tion that he was subjected to external pressures causing him emotional and 
physical problems. However, the Appeal Referee found that the record fails 
to support the Plaintiff's contention that he was ill, stating: 
••• He did not see a doctor until August 8, 1981 
and he failed to notify the employer on either Aug-
ust 5, or August 6, 1981 that he was ill and unable 
to work.· There is no evidence to indicate that, in 
fact, the claimant was ill on either August 5, or 
August 6, 1981 and i't must be held that, by fa.il ing 
to return to work, the claimant voluntarily left 
his job, inasmuch as he knew he would forfeit his 
job if he did not report back. (R.0036) 
Plaintiff testified that he was absent due to illness. (R.0042) Yet, 
he did not see a doctor until August 7, 1981, (R.0064) after he was told 
of the tennination action. Plaintiff's physician reported that Plaintiff 
was seen for "anxiety and nervous disorders," a "situational condition" 
related to the air traffic controllers strike. (R.0064) The Assistant 
Regional Flight Surgeon for the F.A.A. reviewed the Plaintiff's doctor's 
report and concluded there were no medical i ndi cations of i 11 ness, only the 
Plaintiff's subjective complaints, and that, therefore, the Plaintiff's ill-
ness did not render him unfit for duty. { R. 0058) The Plaintiff's testimony 
on this point is also very self-serving, and ambiguous: 
Referee: Well did you mention to Mr. Lee that you were 
having medical problems? 
- 10 -
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Claimant: Not at this time. I wasn't even that aware 
of the fact at this point. I mean a person 
that has a nervous breakdown, you have a 
heck of a time convincing of it. 
Referee: You know I don't really have evidence that 
you ·had a nervous breakdown. 
Claimant: I'm not saying that - -
Referee: I imagine there were 130 individuals roughly 
that were experiencing some of the same 
symptoms you were. 
Claimant: That might be a good assumption. Maybe 
there was a lot of militant types out there 
that weren't. 
Referee: Well, that's possible, but I don't think 
your reaction would be that abnormal, con-
sidering what was going on. You know some-
times I don't sleep too well at nights 
thinking what's going to take place the next 
day myself. So I don't really have evidence 
that you· had an actual nervous breakdown. 
Claimant: I didn't say that. Please. If you took me 
wrong on that, I'm just saying I was making 
an observation that you asked me, did I know 
I was sic.k at the time, and I'm saying in 
some illnesses, you don't know you have it 
until three, four, five days later. Isn't 
that a possibility? 
Referee: I guess it's a possibility, but you 
Claimant: Isn't it as possible as everybody out there 
being a nervous wreck over a strike and some 
people not. I mean, there's a million pos-
sibilities. 
In light of such evidence the Appeal Referee and Board of Review prop-
erly concluded that the claimant was not prevented by illness from reporting 
to work. 
- 11 -
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POINT IV 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DISCHARGED, HE IS 
STILL NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS. 
As explained in Point III hereof, the jurisdictions which have consid-
ered the issue of discharge v. quit in cases of absenteeism have split in 
their conclusions. Part of the reason for this dichotomy arises from the 
particular facts of each case being adjudicated. Another part of the reason 
; s that the facts sometimes support different conclusions. For example, 
see Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review, Supra. 
However, should this Court decide the facts herein amount to a dis-
charge, Pl ai nti ff is sti 11 not entitled to benefits. Pl ai nti ff' s partici-
pation in an i l_l egal work stoppage and failure to report to work after 
requested to do so is willful disregard of his employer's interest that is 
sufficient to constitute willful misconduct. See Bays v. Com., Unemployment 
Compensation Bd., 437 A. 2 d 72 (Pa. Comwl th. 1981) , Reinhard v. Com., U tiemp. 
Comp. Bd of Review, 410 A. 2d 401 (Pa. Cmwl th. 1980). Plaintiff, therefore, 
cannot prevail.. See also, Januzik v. Department of Employment Security, 569 
P. 2d 1112 (Utah, 1977), in which this court stated: 
It has frequently been held in other jurisdictions that 
excessive absenteeism without good cause, constitutes 
willful misconduct, particularly where the employee fails 
to report to his employer, or continues to be absent or 
tardy after warnings by the employer. [Footnote ommit-
ted.] 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Board of Review denying Plaintiff unemployment 
benefits on the basis that he left work voluntarily without good cause is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Plaintiff does not dis-
pute his disqualification for the period of August 3 through August 6, 1981, 
due to his participation in an illegal work stoppage. The decision of the 
Board of Review, being reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious, should 
be affi nned. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 1982. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General of Utah 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
By 
---.Kr.--..A~11~a-n__.Za~b-e~1--------------
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